Accounting Discretion of Banks During a Financial Crisis
Author/Editor: Luc Laeven, Harry Huizinga
Release Date: © September, 2009
ISBN
: 978-1-45187-354-2
Stock #: WPIEA2009207
English
Stock Status: Available
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| Yes |
Description
This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.
Taxonomy
Asset prices , Bank regulations , Banks and banking , Capital markets , Economic development , Financial crisis , Financial institutions and markets , International financial system , Investment
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Luc Laeven ; Harry Huizinga
