Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Policy Credibility
Author/Editor: Turgut Kisinbay, Ondra Kamenik, Ali Alichi, Charles Freedman, Marianne Johnson, Kevin Clinton, Huigang Chen, Douglas Laxton
Release Date: © April, 2009
ISBN
: 978-1-45187-241-5
Stock #: WPIEA2009094
English
Stock Status: Available
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| Yes |
Description
This paper presents a model for Inflation Targeting under imperfect policy credibility. It modifies the conventional model in three ways: an endogenous policy credibility process, by which monetary policy can gain or lose credibility over time; non-linearities in the inflation equation and in the credibility generating process; and an explicit loss function. The model highlights problems associated with the practice of setting a series of rigid near-term inflation targets. Also, unfavorable supply shocks pose a difficult problem: an appropriate response involves an interest rate increase, some loss of output, and a period of increased inflation. A delayed response can result in a prolonged period of stagflation.
Taxonomy
Demand , Economic development , Economic policy , Monetary policy
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Turgut Kisinbay ; Ondra Kamenik ; Ali Alichi ; Charles Freedman ; Marianne Johnson ; Kevin Clinton ; Huigang Chen ; Douglas Laxton
