Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules
Author/Editor: Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton
Release Date: © April, 2009
ISBN
: 978-1-45187-223-1
Stock #: WPIEA2009076
English
Stock Status: Available
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| Yes |
Description
This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes, or, if it enters private utility, government spending. The welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.
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Taxonomy
Business cycles , Economic development , Economic policy , Economic stabilization , Fiscal policy , Monetary policy
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Michael Kumhof ; Douglas Laxton
