Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View

WPIEA2008047 Image
Price:  $18.00

Author/Editor: Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn
Release Date: © February, 2008
ISBN : 978-1-45186-909-5
Stock #: WPIEA2008047
English
Stock Status: Available

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Description

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.

Taxonomy

Capital markets , Economic policy , Financial institutions and markets , Political economy




More publications in this series: Working Papers


More publications by: Donato Masciandaro ; Marc Quintyn