Description

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

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Taxonomy

Banks and banking , Central banks , Economic policy , Financial institutions and markets , Monetary policy

More publications in this series: Working Papers

More publications by: Helge Berger ; Volker Nitsch ; Tonny Lybek