Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

We investigate whether private information about citizens' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in the former case can entry be revealing. We apply these results to Rogoff's (1990) political budget cycle model: as interests are common, low-ability candidates are screened out at the entry stage, and so there is no signaling via fiscal policy. In a variant of Rogoff's model where citizens differ in honesty, interests are conflicting, so the political budget cycle can persist.
Publication date: March 2002
ISBN: 9781451972658
$15.00
Add to Cart by clicking price of the language and format you'd like to purchase
Available Languages and Formats
English
Prices in red indicate formats that are not yet available but are forthcoming.
Topics covered in this book

This title contains information about the following subjects. Click on a subject if you would like to see other titles with the same subjects.

Civics and Citizenship , Civics and Citizenship , Asymmetric Information , Citizen-Candidate , Representative Democracy , Signaling Games , and Political Budget Cycles , voters , probability , election , voting , elections , Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking , Legislatures , and Voting Behavior , Positive Analysis of Po

Summary